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ABSTRACT Norway has traditionally had an ambiguous relation to international 
cooperation. Norway has on the one hand been an active member of United Nations 
and NATO and has signed several international treaties and agreements.  On 
the other hand Norwegian voters have in national referenda twice turned down 
government proposals to join the European Union. At both occasions a majority 
of the elites were in favor of EU membership. Recent electoral studies have 
demonstrated that voters’ support for EU has been further reduced since the latest 
referendum. An elite survey conducted in 2015 showed that also among the elites 
backing of EU has been reduced, particularly among top leaders within private 
business. Findings reported in this article do not indicate that the dominant elites 
are particularly concerned with the lack of codetermination accompanying the 
non-member status.  The decreasing endorsement of EU among Norwegian elites is 
probably a result of a pragmatic assessment that Norway manages quite well as a 
non-member and of a certainty that negative opinions in the population forbid any 
attempt to take up the EU-issue again. 
KEYWORDS: Elite attitudes towards internationalization, ambiguity, EU, 
international treaties
Norway has since World War II had an ambiguous relation to international 
cooperation. One the one hand, Norway is an active member of a large number 
of international organizations, first of all of United Nations. Norway was one 
of the 50 nations that signed the UN-treaty in 1945 and thus is one of the 
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basic members. Norway has repeatedly stated that the UN is a cornerstone of 
Norwegian foreign policy. 
On the other hand, Norway joined the Western Alliance (NATO) with 
skepticism, both on the right and left side of the political landscape. Some 
politicians in the Conservative Party and the Liberal Party were worried about 
national sovereignty. On the left side NATO-membership met resistance from 
communists and the left wing of the ruling labor party. The outcome was a 
compromise on NATO amongst the elites (except the radical left) which elevated 
security policy above partisan politics (Østerud 2007). 
Norway has signed several international treaties which are binding for 
Norwegian policies, inter alia international human rights conventions, various 
environmental agreements and the international agreement which established 
the World Trade Organization. The human rights conventions are partly 
incorporated into Norwegian law and binds Norwegian legal interpretation 
to supranational court decisions. The cooperation through the World Trade 
Organization also implies that Norway is bound by international rules. 
Norwegian authorities entered all these agreements convinced about their 
significance for international trade and relations, but conscious about the 
accompanying bindings on Norwegian politics. However, during the latest two 
decades there has been a growing criticism of these effects (Østerud, Engelstad 
and Selle 2003). Leading Norwegian academics, in particular, have claimed that 
the international treaties have led to a “judicialization” of Norwegian politics. 
More and more policy questions are decided by courts, national or supranational, 
based upon the binding international treaties, and less room is left for decisions 
by the national politicians.   
Norway has a highly open economy where about 40 per cent of Norwegian 
products and services are exported, making Norway dependent upon access 
to international markets, first and foremost in Europe. Nonetheless, twice the 
Norwegian voters have turned down in national referendums – in 1972 and 1994 
– government proposals to join the European Union. In contrast Denmark joined 
EU in 1973 and Finland and Sweden in 1995. At both occasions the majority of the 
political and economic elites and the central mass media were strongly in favor of 
EU membership, while large groups of the population were opposed, backed by 
rural elites and left political parties. The outcome of the two referenda unsettled 
the political landscape in Norway for a long period afterwards. For instance, the 
election result in 1972 led to a number of changes in the political parties. 
The opposition against EU was spurred on the one hand by a widespread fear 
of loss of control of Norwegian natural resources. The fisheries were unwilling 
to share Norwegian fish resources with fishing vessels from EU countries. 
The agricultural sector insisted on continued national preferential treatment to 
41
CORVINUS JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY AND SOCIAL POLICY VOL. 8 (2017)3S
ELITE AMBIGUITY TOWARDS INTERNATIONALIZATION? THE  CASE OF NORWAY
compensate for the difficult ‘arctic’ conditions of agricultural production. On 
the other hand, left wing parties and groups expressed strong skepticism to what 
was perceived as a liberalistic dominance within EU.  
But the opposition against EU also had historical roots. Since the 19th century 
a tension between centre and periphery has been a crucial cleavage in Norwegian 
politics (Rokkan 1987). At the turn of the 19th century several popular 
movements emerged, like the language movement, the teetotal movement and 
the Christian lay movement. These popular movements were to a large extent 
rooted in rural areas. Their leaders formed a national-liberal political alliance 
with small business owners, farmers, teachers and liberal professions also 
strongly represented in the rural areas. These rural groups and movements were 
opposed to elite civil servants and business elites in the capital and other large 
cities. This historical cleavage was manifested both in the 1972 and the 1994 
referenda with the pro-EU centre and the anti-EU periphery representing each 
side. Since the 1994 referendum Norwegian politicians have abstained from 
taking up the EU issue again. 
As a substitute for full EU membership Norway instead signed the treaty of 
the European Economic Area (EEA). EEA is a treaty between the EU-countries 
and the three EFTA-countries Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway which gives 
the EEA-countries access to the inner market of EU. At the same time it gives 
EU a significant role in the EEA-countries’ legislation. Norway’s management 
of its resources, including oil and gas, is challenged by the EU. The rules that are 
considered as necessary for the management of scarce authorities by Norwegian 
authorities are seen as restrictions on competition by the EU. Therefore Norway 
is under both political and legal pressure from the EU to abandon its national 
prerogatives to manage its natural resources (Østerud 2007). 
Gӧncz (2017) has discussed different theoretical models for describing the 
institutional setting of the European Union, particularly federalism versus 
intergovernmentalism. None of these models are quite relevant for describing 
the particular relation Norway as a non-member has to EU. The Norwegian 
scholars Eriksen and Fossum (2015:239) have claimed that states like Switzerland 
and Norway are increasingly closely associated to a constantly changing and 
integrating entity over which they have no formal say. These countries relinquish 
sovereignty and this is not compensated through co-determination. The two 
scholars argue that EU’s closely associated non-members (including Norway) 
exist under what they describe as a form of self-inflicted hegemony, with EU as 
the hegemon. 
There is considerable skepticism toward the EEA treaty within parts of 
the labor movement and among groups affiliated with the fisheries and the 
agricultural sector. 
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Despite the dilemmas and tensions which accompany Norway’s international 
participation an elite study which was conducted in 2000 showed that Norwegian 
elites nonetheless exhibited a strong support for EU (Gulbrandsen et al. 2002). 
74 per cent of the Norwegian top leaders who participated in the study stated 
that they probably would have voted for EU-membership if a new referendum 
was organized. In an electoral study which was carried out in 2001 only 41 per 
cent of the voters reported that they would have voted for joining EU (Aardal 
2003).
Since the turn of the millennium Western societies have been confronted with 
several serious challenges, inter alia climate changes, a huge refugee crisis, and 
not the least the international financial crisis in 2007, which primarily had its 
origin in USA.  The finance crisis caused severe problems in several EU countries, 
like increasing unemployment, shrinking welfare budgets and national debt. The 
question is whether these developments have affected Norwegian elites’ support 
for international cooperation and supranationality. Have the shortcomings of 
international capitalism and EU’s profound problems moved Norwegian top 
leaders to become more skeptical towards EU? In other words, were Norwegian 
elites in 2015 less willing to join EU than fifteen years earlier? Were the elites 
in 2015 concerned about loss of national authority to supranational institutions 
as the result of having entered into binding international treaties? Which elite 
groups were most international and which elites were most reserved against 
internationalization? 
Above I showed that the attitudes of Norwegian citizens to membership in 
international organizations as EU and NATO have been related to basic cleavages 
and issues in Norwegian politics. To what extent is also the international 
orientation of Norwegian elites today related to these cleavages?
CLEAVAGES AND ISSUES IN NORWEGIAN POLITICS 
Historically the political parties in Norway and citizens’ electoral decisions 
have been aligned along three basic cleavages and political issues (Rokkan 
1987; Aardal 2003). One central issue has been the role and scope of the state. 
Closely related to this issue is the extent of economic redistribution through 
taxes and a solidarity based income politics. The two biggest political parties in 
Norway – the Conservative Party and The Labor Party represent each side of 
this private – public cleavage. Another significant issue concerns the securing of 
settlement and acceptable standards of living in rural areas through subsidized 
prices on agricultural products and through economic transfers, – the centre – 
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periphery cleavage. Thirdly, traditionally also the position of religious values in 
the Norwegian society was an important political issue and an origin to several 
political conflicts. An increasing secularization in the Norwegian society 
has, however, limited the political importance of this religious dimension. A 
testimony of which is that the Christian People’s Party received only 4 per cent 
of the votes in the recent parliamentary election. During the latest decades the 
emergence of the environmental movement has brought in the conflict between 
growth and protection as an important dividing line in Norwegian politics. 
Finally, as in several other European countries immigration has become a 
significant and heated political issue. The Progress Party, a right wing populist 
party, has grown to be the third largest party in Norway, first and foremost based 
upon their strong opposition to immigration, particular from the third world.
In the following I will examine to what extent and how the elites’ international 
orientation is related to three of these cleavages in Norwegian politics: (1) The 
Private – public dimension, (2) the centre – periphery dimension, and (3) the 
immigration issue.
DATA AND METHOD
In the following I shall attempt to answer the questions which were formulated 
above by help of data from a study of elites in Norway which was carried out 
in 2015, The Norwegian Leadership Study 2015. The Norwegian Leadership 
Study 2015 was a survey of a net sample of 1352 Norwegian top leaders within 
ten sectors of the Norwegian society: (1) Politics (members of parliament, state 
secretaries, mayors of the largest municipalities),  (2) civil service, (3) culture, 
(4) mass media, (5) private business, (6) civic/voluntary organizations, (7) 
universities and large research institutes,  (8) police and courts of justice, (9) 
military services, and (10) the church. The Leadership Study was conducted 
by Institute for Social Research in collaboration with Statistics Norway. The 
response rate of the survey was 71.5. The purpose of the Leadership Study 2015 
was to examine the social background and careers of Norwegian top leaders, 
their relationships to each other, their attitudes to key policy issues, their 
lobbying, etc. 
As measures of the attitudes of the Norwegian elites towards internationalization 
I have first used the answers to a question about what they would have voted if 
a new referendum about EU-membership was held. This is the same question 
which was used in the elite study in 2000, giving me the possibility to examine 
whether the share of EU sympathizers has changed during the latest fifteen 
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years. While the members of parliament were asked this question in 2000, in 
2015 only state secretaries and selected mayors were requested to state their 
opinion on this issue.   
I have used the replies to this question to construct two groups: (1) Proponents 
and (2) opponents of EU.  I have then located these two groups along the three 
selected political dimensions in Norwegian politics.
Secondly, the top leaders were asked, as in the 2000 survey, to consider 
whether national self-determination is too weak. 
Thirdly, they were requested whether the national authority of the Norwegian 
parliament and government may be weakened if Norway adopts international 
legislation within the five following areas: (1) International trade, (2) international 
law of the sea, (3) international environmental protection, (4) international penal 
law, and (5) international human rights. The leaders were given three response 
alternatives: (1) A big possibility, (2) little possibility, (3) no possibility. The 
replies to these questions were distributed equally. Based upon these replies I 
have therefore constructed two groups among the elites: (1) ‘Internationalists’ 
who do not fear that signing international treaties undermine national authority, 
and (2) ‘nationalists’ who do believe that such treaties weaken the power of 
national authorities. All respondents who scored 1 on each of the five questions 
were defined as nationalists. Respondents with all other combinations of answers 
were defined as internationalists. I have then located these two groups along the 
three selected dimensions in Norwegian politics.
As a measure of the elites’ stance on the private – public issue I constructed 
an index based upon respondents’ opinions regarding the following four 
statements: (a) ‘It is more important to extend public services than to reduce 
taxes’; (b) ‘In Norway one should put stronger emphasis upon privatisation 
and a smaller public sector’; (c) ‘State influence on private business should 
be reduced’; (d) ‘In Norway we have come far enough as to the reduction of 
economic inequalities. The index has values from 1 to 5. Value 5 indicates 
support for an active and intervening state, and value 1 denotes that the 
respondents prefer more privatization and less extensive public services. 
On average the Norwegian elites scored 3.25 on this index, a score which 
indicates that the elites are moderately endorsing an active state and continued 
redistribution of incomes.
The elites’ position in the political debate about support of rural areas in 
Norway was measured in the following manner: They were asked to place 
themselves on a scale from 0 to 10 where 0 indicates that central authorities 
pay too little attention to the rural areas of Norway and 10 means that central 
authorities pay too much attention to these areas. On average the elites scored 
5.6 on the scale. This score means that elites in general believe that the rural 
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areas receive neither too much nor too little attention. This probably implies that 
the elites are satisfied with the profile of the present regional policy.  
To survey the top leaders’ attitudes towards immigration they were again 
requested to rank themselves on a 0-10 scale. In this scale 0 signifies that the 
government should make it easier for immigrants to get access to Norway, 
and the value 10 means that there should be an even stronger limitation of the 
number of immigrants to Norway. On average the elites scored 4.4 on this 
scale, indicating a certain sympathy for a more lenient immigration policy. In 
comparison, an electoral study which was carried out in 2013 showed that the 
population on average scored 6.7 on the same scale (Aardal and Berg 2015). In 
other words, the population wishes more strict immigration policies than the 
elites do. In the Leadership study the politicians who belonged to the right wing 
populist Progress Party scored 8.2 on this scale, demonstrating their extreme 
stance on this issue.   
RESULTS
In the 2015 survey 59 percent of the national top leaders confirmed that they 
would have voted in favor of joining EU if a new referendum was held. This is a 
clear reduction compared to what the respondents stated in the 2000 elite study. 
At that time 74 per cent would have voted for EU membership. In comparison, 
also among the voters support for EU has declined since the start of the new 
millennium. In the aforementioned electoral study in 2001 (Aardal 2007) a 
sample of the population scored 4.5 on a scale where the value 10 expresses that 
Norway should absolutely become member of EU, and the value 0 the opposite. 
In another electoral study in 2013 the voters on average scored only 2.9. 
What are the explanations of the decline in elite support for EU? Has the 
EU-crisis scared the Norwegian elites away from EU? Alternatively, the 
decline may be a result of an emerging perception among Norwegian elites 
that the EEA agreement in reality has weakened Norwegian sovereignty, cf. 
the analysis of Eriksen and Fossum (2015) mentioned above. It is also possible 
that the diminishing support of EU rather represents an acknowledgment that 
Norway manages well outside EU, and that the EEA agreement is sufficient 
for regulating the country’s relationship to EU. Such an acknowledgement may 
have been bolstered by the knowledge that the population today is less willing 
than ever to back a new application for EU membership. It is difficult to establish 
which of these explanations are most relevant, since we have not asked the top 
leaders about their arguments for or against EU. 
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We may possibly learn somewhat more about the reasons for the decline in 
elite support for EU by examining the distribution of potential pro EU votes 
between the various elite groups. Figure 1 shows the percentage of ‘would be’ 
pro EU votes within the various elite groups. It demonstrates that there were 
clear differences in EU support between the various elite groups in Norway in 
2015. In the one end only 42 per cent of the top leaders in the main institutions 
and organizations within the culture sector could imagine joining EU.
Figure 1. Would have voted for EU. Percentages
Also among church leaders (46 per cent) only a minority was intent on voting 
for EU membership in 2015. In 2000 60 per cent of top leaders within the culture 
sector would have voted for EU and only 50 per cent among the church leaders. 
In other words, the decline in EU support has been more pronounced among the 
culture elites. 
The church leaders and the elites within the culture sector have previously 
distinguished themselves as belonging to the left side in the political landscape 
(Gulbrandsen and Engelstad 2005). They support an active welfare state and 
argue in favor of continued redistribution of incomes. That many top leaders 
within these two sectors show reservation to EU membership indicates that their 
opinions are rooted in a basic skepticism towards the political profile of EU. 
In the other end of the scale we see that top leaders within the military services 
(71 per cent) and the civil service (69 per cent) primarily were in favor of joining 
EU. The percentage of top military officers who would have voted for joining 
EU is down from 90 in 2000. Among the senior civil servants the reduction was 
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more moderate, from 79 to 69 per cent. In other words the members of the civil 
service elite seem to have been only moderately worried about EU’s governance 
problems and EU’s power. Both of which elite groups already have extensive 
contact with EU and other European nations. For them joining EU may be seen 
as a natural extension of the present relations. They may also be interested in the 
possibilities for more codetermination which will accompany a full membership 
status.
In 2000 about 51 per cent of the politicians (mostly members of parliament) were 
EU supporters. Among the few politicians included in the 2015 survey 47 per cent 
declared that they would have voted in favor of EU membership. Because so few 
politicians were posed the question of EU-membership in 2015, it is not possible to 
compare these two percentages. Nonetheless, the 2015 result may indicate that EU 
attitudes among politicians have changed less than among other groups. 
The strongest decline in approval of EU between 2000 and 2015 took place 
among top leaders within private business – from 90 to 59 per cent. The strong 
decline of potential pro EU votes within the private business elite may be 
due to a growing understanding that business interests are best served with 
continued national control of vital resources like oil, gas, hydropower, and fish. 
I.e. a growing number of business leaders may prefer that Norway maintain 
the EEA agreement, in spite of its limitations. Business leaders want access to 
international markets. But they also want to continue receiving various forms 
of public support which can alleviate the pressures of international competition. 
Such a stance is in line with a ‘both-and’ attitude towards public goods and 
subsidies which is prevalent among private business leaders in Norway. They 
may ideologically be opposed to the Norwegian welfare state and prefer more 
market solutions.  And they may praise a liberalistic ideology. This posture has, 
however, always gone well with requests for more state expenditure or particular 
benefits for specific sectors of the economy.    
If there was a growing elite disquietude with the increasing power of EU over 
Norwegian affairs, we should expect that this was expressed in an increasing 
general concern with national self-determination.  In 2000 only 27 per cent 
of the top leaders claimed that national self-determination in Norway was too 
weak. 15 years later still only 26 per cent of the members of the Norwegian 
elite groups expressed the same opinion. In other words, there has not been any 
increase in elite concern about national sovereignty. Eriksen and Fossum (2015) 
may be right that being associated with EU through the EEA treaty implies a self-
inflicted hegemony. The elites themselves seem, however, to express somewhat 
less apprehension for this situation. This finding raises some doubt whether the 
declining EU-support can be explained as an expression of an increasing fear of 
loss of national independence. 
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Limited but binding international agreements and treaties constitute another 
form of supranationality. Figure 2 shows the percentage of all the top leaders who 
believe that such treaties may weaken the national authority of the parliament 
and the government.
Figure 2. Can international legislation weaken national authority? Percentages of 
those who perceive that there is a large possibility for such negative effects.
The figure demonstrates that within the five areas there are only minorities 
who fear that international legislation may undermine the sovereignty of 
Norwegian political authorities. The Norwegian elites are most reserved with 
treaties concerning international trade and least worried about international 
human rights conventions.  The main impression of this analysis is that 
Norwegian elites mainly are positive towards international legislation and 
treaties. The figure indicates that Norwegian elites in general are more approving 
of internationalization through such limited treaties and agreements than by 
entering encompassing supranational organization as EU. 
Figure 3 presents the percentage of ‘nationalists’, i.e. those members of each 
elite group who across the five areas responded that there is a large possibility 
that international treaties will undermine national authority. The Figure reveals 
that in general there are only minorities within each elite group that fear the 
negative consequences of international legislation on national authority. Judges, 
senior prosecutors and heads within the police appear as more skeptical than 
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the other elite groups. This finding is understandable. It is exactly the agents 
in the judiciary, particularly the judges, who most directly will experience the 
limitations which accompany international legislation. They will most often 
encounter situations where national legislation must give way to international 
conventions and treaties and where their own decisions are overruled by 
international courts.  Also the mass media elite and church elite stand out as 
being more reserved with international agreements. In the other end only 11 
per cent of the top officers in the military services are afraid that international 
treaties will impair national independence.
Figure 3. Effects on national authority of international legislation. Percentages of 
those elite members who perceive that there is a large possibility for negative effects.
According to the ‘judicialization thesis’ (see above) politicians should 
be uncomfortable with the effects of international treaties. Figure 3 shows, 
however, that politicians in fact constitute one of the least concerned 
elite groups. Only a minority among them fears that international 
agreements and treaties will weaken the power of the parliament and the 
government.  However, there are distinct differences between the various 
political parties. Figure 4 show the percentage ’nationalists’ among the 
politicians within each of the political parties. Few of the politicians 
belonging to the Socialist Party (SV), the Center Party (SP), the Christian 
People’s Party (KrF), and the Liberal party (Venstre) participated in the 
Leadership Study 2015. I have nonetheless included politicians from SV 
and KrF in Figure 4. 
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Figure 4. Effects on national authority of international legislation. Percentages of 
those among politicians who perceive that there is a large possibility for negative 
effects.
Figure 4 demonstrates that there are two political parties which stand 
out as ‘nationalists’ compared to the other parties – Socialist Left Party and 
the Progress party. 50 and 45 per cent (respectively) of their representatives 
declare that they fear international agreements may impair the authority of the 
Norwegian parliament and government. The members of the other parties are 
predominantly positive to international conventions and treaties. 
Previous electoral studies have shown that citizens who voted on SV, in 
general were positive to an international community with less emphasis on 
borders. However, when they were asked about signing international agreements 
the voters of Socialist Left Parties expressed less enthusiasm (Aardal 2007). In 
other words, the socialist politicians seem to reflect attitudes that are common 
among their voters. The skepticism of the socialists represents what we may 
term a ‘progressive’ nationalism, rooted in an ingrained fear that capitalist 
interests are dominating international agreements. 
The opinions of the politicians from the Progress Party, however, belong to a 
different set of ideological ideas. Above I showed that the political representatives 
of the Progress Party defend very strict immigration policies. Their kind of 
nationalism is of a chauvinist nature, anti-elitist and with significant xenophobic 
elements (Mudde and Kaltwasser 2012). 
Nonetheless, the main picture is that most elite groups in Norway and a 
majority of the politicians do not fear the consequences of binding international 
treaties. How can this be explained? I believe the reasons for this posture can 
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be found in the character of the relevant international agreements and treaties. 
Many of them are about attempting to protect essential values and interests, 
as environmental concerns and human rights, against the unilateral and self-
serving actions of strong or authoritarian players on the international scene. 
These strong players may be big nations or large multinational corporations. 
Elite support for these international treaties is in line with the present national 
foreign policy ambition to make Norway a brand for peacemaking, development 
aid and a better environment.
Some of the treaties primarily regulate the relations between small and big 
countries in ways that may protect the interests of small countries.  An illustration 
of this aspect of international agreements is the United Nations Convention on 
the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) from 1982, a result of the third conference about 
the law at the sea. Among other things UNCLOS determined that up to 200 
nautical miles from the coast a state can create an economic zone, with exclusive 
right to exploit all natural resources. Coastal States have also rights over their 
continental shelf, even though it extends more than 200 nautical miles from 
the coast. These international rules enabled a small country as Norway to take 
control over the extraction of oil and gas from the North Sea and benefit from 
the huge incomes which flow from this extraction.  In other words, in spite of the 
binding character of UNCLOS, in the Norwegian case it contributed to strengthen 
Norwegian sovereignty. Supporting UNCLOS illustrates very well a main strand 
in Norwegian foreign policy – to seek justice and cooperation in international 
affairs as protection against the hazards of power politics (Østerud 2007). 
Figure 5. International orientation and Norwegian cleavages
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Figure 5 exhibits the relationship between the top leaders’ international 
orientation and their attitudes towards central issues in Norwegian politics. I 
compare four groups of elite individuals: (1) Pro-EU leaders, (2) leaders who 
would have voted against EU, (3) ‘internationalists’, who do not fear that 
international treaties will weaken national authority, and (4) ‘nationalists’ who 
fear such effects. I compare their stance on three basic issues: (1) The conflict 
between a strong state and more market solutions. (2) How much rural areas shall 
be supported. (3) Whether it should be easier or more difficult for immigrants to 
get access to Norway. 
Figure 5 reveals that there is only one issue which clearly separates the four 
groups apart, the extent of support of rural areas, representing the centre-
periphery cleavage in Norwegian politics. EU supporters believe on average 
definitely more than the EU sceptics that central authorities give rural areas too 
much attention. The differences are much smaller when it comes to endorsing an 
active state versus leaving more to the private market. EU-opponents are slightly 
more located to the left in the political landscape than the EU supporters, but the 
difference is small. With the exception of the politicians from the Socialist Left 
Party, the private-public cleavage thus seems to be only weakly related to the 
elites’ degree of EU-support and international orientation. In addition, with the 
exception of the politicians from the Progress Party, differences are negligent in 
the attitudes towards immigration policies. All four groups are moderately in 
favor of giving more immigrants’ access to Norway.   
It is interesting to notice that elite fear of supranationality and skepticism 
towards EU in general is not coupled with anti-immigration sentiments.  Even 
nationalist oriented elite individuals are reserved against a stricter immigration 
policy. The problem is the populist Progress Party which, like other populist 
parties in Europe, nourishes itself from and amplifies a resistance in the 
population against immigrants from particularly the third world. 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
The Norwegian society has traditionally had an ambiguous relationship to 
international cooperation and supranationality. The problematic relation to 
internationalization has in recent time been most pronounced in connection with 
the EU issue, the question of whether to join the European Union or not. The EU 
issue has twice generated a deep division between elites and the population.  As 
a result EU membership is today taken out of Norwegian political discussions. 
In general Norwegian elites seem to be positive to international cooperation 
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and participation in supranational institutions, whether that is international 
organizations or agreements. A majority of Norwegian elites does not seem to 
fear binding international treaties and conventions. Moreover, there is a strong 
elite consensus on the necessity for a small country to buttress an international 
legal order to protect against large nations’ unilateral exercise of power.
The relationship to the EU is, however, complex. On the one hand, through 
the EEA Agreement, Norway is obliged to introduce EU directives relating to 
the internal market in Norwegian law. By adopting these directives Norway 
has to a large extent been integrated into the European Union, but without 
co-determination. Accordingly, it would have been better if Norway became 
a full member of EU.  However, the findings reported in this paper indicate 
that there is a declining support for such a solution.  Admittedly, a majority 
of Norwegian elites would still have voted in favor of joining EU.  But the 
decreasing endorsement of EU membership may be an indication of a growing 
uneasiness about the relationship to the European Union. The reasons for this 
uneasiness are not clear. The findings reported above do not indicate that the 
dominant elites are particular concerned with the lack of co-determination which 
accompanies the non-member status. The lack of formal access to the decision-
making arenas within EU is in practice to some extent compensated through 
informal contacts between EU politicians and EU-officials and their Norwegian 
colleagues. In addition, the other Nordic countries keep Norwegian authorities 
well informed on what is going on in EU. These countries also represent an 
indirect channel of influence in EU matters. I believe the decreasing willingness 
among Norwegian elites to join EU is more a result of a realistic and pragmatic 
assessment that Norway manages quite well as a non-member. Moreover, this 
realism also includes a certainty that the negative opinions in the population 
forbid any attempt to take up the EU-issue again. 
Nonetheless, I guess there will continue to be considerable elite support for 
EU, for various reasons. Within the private business elite it will still be access 
to the European markets which counts as the main argument. Within important 
sections of the political leadership of Norway, particular within the Labor Party, 
there is also a deep-seated belief that the European Union is a very important 
European peace project. A testimony of which is that in 2012 the Nobel Peace 
Prize was awarded to the European Union. Further, while there earlier was 
a widespread skepticism towards the liberalistic aspect of the union, many 
opponents have come to acknowledge that the social dimension has gained a 
stronger place. 
The elite opposition to internationalization and supra-nationality has three 
sources. There is as mentioned above, a socialist resistance, mainly against 
EU. This resistance seems, however, to be limited. Secondly, a populistic and 
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xenophobic nationalism has emerged during the latest decades, first of all 
promoted and spurred by the right wing Progress Party. This nationalism is 
not shared by other elites. Thirdly, the main opponents of EU are the defenders 
of rural interests, and they are primarily represented by the Center Party, with 
strong ties to the agricultural sector in Norway. These interests are first and 
foremost against EU. The Center Party is located to the left of center in the 
political landscape. Nonetheless, in their political language they do not hesitate 
to use populistic arguments. For instance, representatives of the party frequently 
set the elites in the capital and the people in the rural areas against each other.   
It is striking that the (modest) elite opposition in Norway against 
internationalization and supranationality is so little related to resistance to 
immigration. One reason for this situation may be that the rural center/left 
populism of the Center Party so far has prevented further growth of a right wing 
populistic nationalism, as represented by the Progress Party.        
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